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Between 1976 and 1983, a military dictatorship ruled Argentina and
brought that country into an era of state-directed terror aimed at the
civilian population. During that period, a small and vulnerable human
rights community, allied with international backers, attempted to stay
the hand of the military state and provide a measure of protection for the
victims and potential victims of the dictatorship. The struggle was to
defend the most elementary of human rights: freedom from arbitrary
detention, torture, and summary execution. While the stakes in this
struggle were high-life or death for thousands of individuals-it was
nonetheless an unfortunately familiar effort to define the limits of what a
state may inflict on its citizens.
With the election of a civilian government in October 1983, however,
this battle moved onto the unfamiliar ground of setting an affirmative
agenda for the trial and punishment of those responsible for acts of state
terror. With little guidance from Argentine history or the experience of
other countries in the transition from military to civilian rule, and with
the constant rumblings of future military uprisings as a backdrop, the
restored civilian political and legal institutions turned to the issue that
would dominate the first year of civilian rule: the prosecution of the
military.
The assumption of power by the civilian authorities did not terminate
the impact of the military period on the fledgling government. The pecu-
liar method of repression perfected by the Argentine military-disap-
pearance without a trace into a parallel, extralegal police and military
network-left behind tens of thousands of family members and friends of
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victims. These people could not simply bury their dead and move on, but
were driven by an unyielding need to learn the fate of their loved ones.
Perhaps more than any other feature of the Argentine military's guerra
sucia-"dirty war"-the practice of forced disappearances generated the
demand for prosecution of the perpetrators of human rights abuses
which proved a major issue in the 1983 elections.
The government of President Raul Alfonsin faced the virtually unprec-
edented task of investigating and prosecuting its own armed forces for
human rights abuses. The government undertook this task with caution.
In particular, it determined that all prosecutions-those brought by vic-
tims and their relatives as well as by the government-would be heard in
the first instance by a military tribunal rather than a civilian court. In
addition, the government created a "following orders" defense available
to lower and middle-ranking officers accused of human rights abuses.
This Article will argue that the statute embodying these policies con-
tains many constitutional difficulties, and that the government has at-
tempted to apply the statute to a much broader range of cases than a
reasonable statutory contruction would permit. Above all, the policy of
caution and conciliation underlying the statute has backfired. This Arti-
cle contends that the government's position in these human rights cases
is not only legally untenable but profoundly anti-legal and in-suited to
the government's own stated goal: the establishment of a stable civilian
government upon a foundation of the rule of law.
I. Repression Under the Dictatorship
Immediately upon seizing power in 1976, the military junta assumed
the task that for several years had been carried out by right-wing para-
military outfits: the elimination of what they deemed "subversive ele-
ments." Instead of leaving the bodies of its victims on the streets, as the
paramilitary groups had done, the new dictatorship created an elaborate
network of clandestine task forces, torture centers, and concentration
camps into which its victims disappeared.' While many of the
desaparecidos were eventually released, a still undetermined number,
1. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS, NUNCA
MAS [hereinafter cited as NUNCA MAS] 8-10 (1984). The National Commission compiled a list
of over 1300 names of military officials directly implicated in acts of repression and identified
by victims. See Los Nombres de la Infamia, EL PERIODISTA, Nov. 3-9, 1984 (special supple-
ment). While the precise numbers of police and military officials involved is not known-and
indeed may never be known-the magnitude of the repressive apparatus may be gleaned from
the fact that the Commission identified 365 separate clandestine concentration camps and tor-
ture centers operating in Argentina from 1976 to 1983.
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many of whom must be presumed dead, still remain unaccounted for.2
A. The Technique of "Disappearance"
Although the Argentine experience had the unfortunate distinction of
introducing the term desaparecido into the international lexicon, the ac-
tual workings of such a system are perhaps not as familiar. A typical
example can be taken from a leading case now pending in the Supreme
Court of Justice. In that case, an individual, Alfredo Giorgi, 3 was ab-
ducted from his workplace by an armed "task force" operating under the
authority of the Argentine military. Giorgi was taken first to an automo-
bile maintenance shop of the Federal Police, then to the "Club Atl&ico"
concentration camp, and finally to another facility within the city of Bue-
nos Aires currently occupied by the Federal Police. From 1978 to 1979,
however, the latter facility functioned as a concentration camp under the
direct jurisdiction of the First Army Corps. The camp, known as
"Olimpo," had a capacity of 150 prisoners and was run as a coordinated
operation of the army and the Federal Police.4 According to numerous
witnesses, the prisoners were severely tortured during their detention and
were kept in a cell measuring less than three cubic meters. When the
camp was dismantled in February 1979, in anticipation of the September
1979 visit of a delegation of the Organization of American States investi-
gating reports of human rights violations, 5 the persons were transferred
2. The exact number of deaths caused by the "dirty war" remains unknown. See infra note
7 and accompanying text. The National Commission, which documented the disappearance of
8960 persons, expressed its belief that the actual number of disappearances, which would prob-
ably remain uncertain, significantly exceeded 9000 since many family members had been afraid
to report disappearances. NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 479. Furthermore, the means of
disposing of bodies, see infra note 7 and accompanying text, renders accounting difficult. Wide
variations in the reported number of disappearances occur in media accounts. See N.Y. Times,
June 10, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 26 (6000); Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1984, at Hl, col. 6 (15,000,
including those who reappeared, as estimated by National Commission member Marshall
Meyer).
3. Giorgi's family was represented by CELS. Giorgi, a chemical engineer at the National
Institute of Industrial Technology in Buenos Aires, "disappeared" on November 27, 1978. His
fate remains unknown.
4. See NuNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 80, 163-66.
5. The Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States conducted
an investigation of reports of human rights abuses in Argentina in September, 1979. Argentina,
as a member of the OAS, was formally subject to its decision to conduct an investigation,
although not until 1984 did Argentina accept the human rights conventions of the OAS and the
jurisdiction of the Interamerican Court on Human Rights. The report and recommendations
of the Commission, published in 1980, see infra note 11, were thus precatory and unenforce-
able. Nevertheless, the visit and report were of tremendous importance in creating interna-
tional political pressure on the Argentine government, as well as receptivity to the thousands
of political refugees leaving Argentina. Within Argentina, the report was prohibited but circu-
lated clandestinely-it has now been published as "The Prohibited Report"-and was of great
value in awakening many Argentines to a situation many had chosen to ignore. The OAS visit,
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from the camp.
As the desaparecidos believed at the time and the government's official
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons later confirmed,
transfer from a concentration camp such as Olimpo was tantamount to a
death sentence. 6 Many of these prisoners were dropped from army heli-
copters, dead or alive, into the ocean or the wide Rio de la Plata, buried
in unmarked graves, burned, or otherwise disposed of in a manner calcu-
lated to make it difficult or impossible to find the body or identify the
victim.7 The existence and extent of this clandestine system of torture
centers and detention centers was a well-kept secret in Argentina for
many years, due to a silent and fearful press and a citizenry unwilling to
believe that such acts could take place in a civilized country. The disap-
pearance of a young neighbor, classmate, or co-worker was noted with
whispers to the effect that "he must have been involved in something,"8
i.e. something subversive. The victim's family was left alone in its search
for any clue to the missing person's fate.
B. The Courts of the Dictatorship
Many families of desaparecidos were intimidated by explicit threats or
the general atmosphere of terror from going to the courts; 9 others were
unable to find a lawyer willing to assist them. 10 For lawyers to sign a
habeas corpus petition was, at the height of the dictatorship, virtually to
sign their own death warrants.11 Petitions for habeas corpus before the
courts of Argentina usually accomplished nothing, since the various "se-
its report, and the principles of international human rights law upon which they were predi-
cated, thus contributed indirectly to the demise of the Argentine dictatorship in 1983.
6. See NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 68-9.
7. See id. at 223-47. The status of the desaparecidos raises difficult legal and political issues.
While the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons could establish the fact of
thousands of summary executions, it could not conclusively determine the precise time and
place of death (or even the fact of death) of a majority of the individuals. In the absence of a
corpus delicti, no conclusive evidence of death could be gathered from the knowledge that
thousands of killings did indeed take place. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo championed
the slogan "Reappearance with Life" to signal.their refusal to accept a silent death for their
disappeared children. Neither the government nor the National Commission was willing to
accept political responsibility for ending their hope. Thus the legal fate of the desaparecidos"
remains in limbo.
8. Id. at 9.
9. See ASAMBLEA PERMANENTE POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (DELEGACI6N NEu-
QUfiN), EXIGIMOS JUSTICIA PORQUE QUEREMOS LA PAZ 7-11 (1982).
10. During the dictatorship, the government posted signs in the courthouses stating that
habeas corpus petitions would not be accepted without the signature of a lawyer. This un-
precedented modification of the nature of the writ of habeas was never officially decreed or
legislated, but was simply imposed by the government.
11. See generally NUNCA MAs, supra note 1, at 416-24; ORGANIZATION OF AMERiCAN
STATES, INTERAMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA [hereinafter cited as OAS REPORT] 233-34.
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curity forces" of the military government invariably denied that the miss-
ing person had been arrested or was in their custody. This denial met
each of the thousands of habeas corpus petitions submitted to the courts
on behalf of individuals arrested or abducted.12
In general, the Supreme Court of Argentina had evolved a policy of
acquiescence in the military seizures of power that have plagued Argen-
tine history.1 3 Nevertheless, the Court, summoning whatever vestiges of
independence it retained, recognized that the uniformly negative re-
sponse to the writ of habeas corpus represented a systematic deprivation
of justice. In the Perez de Smith case, 14 the Court reviewed consolidated
appeals from 400 separate habeas corpus petitions in which the govern-
ment had denied knowledge of an individual's whereabouts. Because
there was no official acknowledgement of custody, the Court declared
itself incompetent to review cases "as presented." However, based on its
"implicit powers," the Court
direct[ed] itself to the National Executive Power to request that it intensify
... the investigation into the whereabouts and situations of those persons
whose disappearance had been denounced before the courts .... 15
12. See NUNCA MAssupra note 1, at 400-07 (1984) (on the inefficacy of the writ of habeas
corpus). See also OAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 224-33. In only two cases during the first
five years of the dictatorship-those of Timerman and Moya-was a habeas corpus petition
successful. Only Timerman received unconditional freedom, see NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at
402, and only as a result of international pressure applied in his case. There were numerous
signs of official direction of these disappearances. One of the most telling was the typical prac-
tice of the task forces of getting a "green light" or "liberated zone" from the regular police
authorities before carrying out an abduction. This entailed notification to the police that an
anti-subversive operation was to be carried out at a particular time and place in order to fore-
stall the troublesome interference of uninformed police officers in what otherwise would ap-
pear to be an unlawful kidnapping. See id. at 19.
13. In a contract claim brought to compel compliance by the government that seized
power in the 1862 coup of Bartolem6 Mitre, the Court reasoned that it could not enforce pre-
coup claims since Mitre, after "the Battle of Pav6n, was competent authority to know and
decide these kinds of cases, by virtue of provisionally exercising all national powers, with the
right of the triumphant Revolution and acquiesence of the people, and by virtue of the serious
duties which that victory imposed." Martinez v. Otero, 2 Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Jus-
ticia (hereinafter cited as Fallos) 127, 143 (1865).
After the coup d'etat of 1930, the Court convened in a special session and declared:
[T]he provisional government that has just constituted itself in this country is, there-
fore, a de facto government whose title cannot be successfully discussed by the judiciary
in that it exercises the administrative and political functions derived from its possession of
force as the [final] resort of order and social security.
Acordada sobre reconocimiento de Gobierno Provincial de ]a Nacion, 158 Fallos 290, 291
(1930). The Court also cited CONSTANTINEAU, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND THE DE FACTO Doc-
TRINE (inability, for policy reasons, to challenge legality of those holding office). The sole
limitation on the Court's recognition of the de facto government was its insistence that the
government abide by its commitment to return to constitutional rule as expeditiously as possi-
ble. By the time of the coups of the 1960s, this commitment had disappeared.
14. Ana Maria Prez de Smith y Otros, 297 Fallos 338, [1977] B La Ley 484 (1977).
15. Id. at 341, [1977] B La Ley at 485. See also Celia Sara Machado y Otros, 302 Fallos
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The Court thus exhorted lower court judges to "exhaust all judicial pro-
cedures in order to effectuate and expedite the purposes of [the institu-
tion of habeas corpus] established in the Constitution and in the law."' 16
Nevertheless, the habeas corpus petitions continued to represent only a
minor aggravation for the military government, and not a real recourse
for the families of the desaparecidos.
There remained, however, another avenue of judicial relief. Under Ar-
gentine criminal procedure, denial of habeas corpus allowed a court
claiming jurisdiction to treat the action as a criminal complaint for ille-
gitimate deprivation of liberty. Victims of crimes or their representatives
could initiate and prosecute criminal complaints. The victim continued
as a party to the criminal proceeding even after the intervention of the
government prosecutor (fiscal). The "plaintiff-prosecutor" system,' 7 a
vestige of the time when criminal law in Argentina was primarily a
means of channelling private retribution, permitted victims and their rel-
atives to pursue criminal prosecutions for human rights abuses in which
the state itself was implicated. During the dictatorship, however, these
criminal prosecutions, like the habeas corpus petitions out of which they
developed, made no headway. Not a single person was successfully pros-
ecuted in either military or civilian courts for any of the disappearances
or murders of civilians.' 8
Not only were the judges unable to secure justice; most were simply
772, [1980] D La Ley 170 (1980) (upon official denial of custody, district court dismissed case;
Supreme Court remanded for further investigation beyond the official executive branch
declaration).
16. 297 Fallos at 340, [1977] B La Ley at 484.
17. The term "plaintiff-prosecutor" is the authors' translation of querellante, the Argentine
term for the victim or relative of the victim who files criminal charges and remains in the case
as a party to the prosecution. Under Argentine criminal law, offenses are divided into three
categories. The first involves those that are considered private crimes (e.g., defamation) in
which the state has no direct interest in the prosecution. The second category comprises non-
felonies in which the government prosecutor (fiscal) may join as a discretionary party. The
third category, serious felonies, includes crimes considered offenses against both the individual
victim and the society. C6digo Penal, art. 71 (C6digos AZ 1983). The plaintiff-prosecutor
takes part in the third category of cases. C6digo de Procidimiento en Materia Penal, arts. 170-
76 (C6digos AZ 1983). The ability of the victim to secure damages in these private criminal
prosecutions makes the plaintiff-prosections functionally similar to an American civil action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
18. See NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 9. The Giorgi case, see supra note 3, was no excep-
tion. On the basis of the Perez de Smith case, see supra note 14 and accompanying text, on
February 22,1979, Giorgi's father petitioned the Supreme Court directly to intervene on behalf
of his son. Five days later, the Court ordered the judge handling the case, which had been
converted into a criminal complaint for illegitimate deprivation of liberty, to pursue all feasible
means of ascertaining Giorgi's fate. After finding its way ultimately to Federal Court No. 1 of
San Martin, the case was provisionally closed for lack of evidence on May 8, 1980. This
resolution was upheld by the Federal Chamber of Appeals Criminal and Correctional Division
and, finally, by the Supreme Court.
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unwilling to intervene. The military dictators, recognizing the power of
an independent judiciary, had replaced most of the judges sitting at the
time of the coup, despite their constitutionally guaranteed life tenure.
The judges appointed by the military, many drawn directly from the
ranks of retired officers, were made subject to removal at the will of the
executive branch, or, in other words, the junta. 19
It was not until the dictatorship began to falter after the Malvinas
War20 of 1982 that the plaintiff-prosecutions made any progress. During
this period the human rights community and its supporters21 demanded
prosecution of the military in civilian courts under the civilian criminal
code. Only after the election did President Alfonsin announce that prose-
cutions would proceed, instead, in the highest military tribunal. During
the first year of civilian rule, this governmental policy found itself at odds
with both the demands of the human rights community for civilian jus-
tice and the military's insistence that no crimes had been committed and
no trials should be held at all. The fate of this policy in the constitutional
courts, while still unresolved, exemplifies both the promise of civilian jus-
tice and its frustration by the Alfonsin government's decision to place
these cases in the tribunals of the military.
II. The Civilian Courts and Military Jurisdiction
A. Progress in the Civilian Courts
During the first months of the civilian government, many new plain-
tiff-prosecutions were brought in civilian courts. Through the discovery
powers of the federal court, which gained effectiveness as the military's
power declined, testimony of several desaparecidos who had survived be-
gan to reveal the fate of those still missing. 22 Evidence began to accumu-
late concerning the responsibility of the armed forces and particular
officers for the disappearances.
The progress of these cases was threatened when the fiscal moved in
19. See NuNCA MAs, supra note 1, at 391-92.
20. While recognizing the disputed status of these islands, the authors refer to them as
Malvinas, rather than Falkiands, as the former comports with the accepted usage in
Argentina.
21. There were eight major national human rights organizations in Argentina at the end of
the dictatorship: the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo,
the Service for Peace and Justice, the Center for Legal and Social Studies, the Permanent
Assembly on Human Rights, the Commission of Relatives of the Disappeared, the Ecumenical
Movement for Human Rights, and the Argentine League for the Rights of Man. E. Mignone,
Organizaciones de Derechos Humanos en Argentina (unpublished memorandum on file with
the Yale Journal of International Law).
22. For example, testimony of these witnesses revealed nearly all that is known about the
fate of Alfredo Giorgi. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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various cases to declare the civilian courts without jurisdiction and to
transfer the cases to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.23 The
fiscal, acting under the express instructions of the executive branch, con-
tended that all criminal accusations against military personnel based on
"acts of service" or acts allegedly committed "in a place subject to exclu-
sive military authority" were subject to military jurisdiction under Arti-
cle 108, section 2, of the Code of Military Justice.24 The fiscal also
referred to the military justice reforms recently passed by the Congress,
soon to be promulgated as Law 23.049, which provided for military juris-
diction over prosecutions of "military personnel of the Armed Forces
and personnel. . under operational control of the Armed Forces [who]
acted from March 24, 1976, until September 29, 1983, in the operations
undertaken with the alleged motive of curbing terrorism. '25 The govern-
ment's decision to place these cases under military jurisdiction must be
evaluated in the context of its overall human rights policy.
B. Human Rights and the Politics of Military Jurisdiction
When President Alfonsin took office on December 10, 1984, he issued
a presidential decree ordering the arrest and prosecution in military court
of the nine generals who had headed the first three juntas.26 He also cre-
ated the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, under
the chairmanship of author Ernesto Sibato, to investigate the fate of the
desaparecidos. 27 Both actions exposed the government to criticism by
both the right wing and the human rights community. The latter re-
garded these decrees as too conciliatory to the military. They criticized
the decision to prosecute the nine former junta members in a military
tribunal as opposed to civilian courts as a hidden amnesty and a sacrifice
of the rule of law.28 They regarded the National Commission as a
watered-down version of the bicameral congressional commission which
23. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is the highest appellate tribunal of the
armed forces.
24. C6digo de Justicia Militar, art. 108, §2, [1951] Anales de Legislacion Argentina 18-19.
The section was amended and narrowed by Law 23.049, but only as applied to subsequent acts.
See infra note 36.
25. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
26. Decree No. 158/83, promulgated Dec. 13, 1983. On the same day, President Alfonsin
issued Decree No. 157/83, ordering the capture and trial of suspected leaders of the
Montoneros guerrilla movement. These decrees followed the newly elected legislature's rejec-
tion of the military government's self-amnesty decree issued shortly before it left office. See
Law 23.040, promulgated Dec. 27, 1983.
27. Decree No. 187/83, promulgated Dec. 15, 1983.
28. See, eg., Alfonsih is not Forceful Enough, Newsweek, Feb. 6, 1984, at 52-53 (interview
with Emilio Mignone).
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they had proposed.29
This criticism grew more insistent with the government's proposal to
channel all criminal actions against the military for human rights
abuses-including those brought by the growing number of plaintiff-
prosecutors-through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The
military justice reforms constituted the main vehicle for the policy an-
nounced by President Alfonsin upon taking office. The reforms provided
that military and police officers accused of human rights abuses under
the dictatorship would be tried in the first instance by their military
peers, subject to review after a limited period by the civilian courts.30
The decision to route all criminal proceedings through military tribu-
nals rested on a political rather than a jurisprudential calculation by the
Alfonsin government. 31 Any evaluation of this strategy must begin with
an understanding of what the Argentine experience was not. Unlike the
much-cited precedent of Nuremburg, any Argentine prosecutions would
not have the security of those initiated by a victorious foreign military
power standing in judgment over its defeated wartime adversary. 32 The
armed forces remained omnipresent after the victory of President
Alfonsin.
The legal framework which the new government devised was therefore
inextricably linked to the political decision to avoid confronting as an
institution the armed forces that had seized power six times since 1930, 33
29. The National Commission was empowered to collect information and testimony and to
issue its report in eight months. However, it lacked the power of congressional commissions to
subpoena witnesses and compel testimony. Thus, it necessarily relied upon the voluntary testi-
mony of victims and a small group of military personnel. See generally NUNCA MAS, supra
note 1, at 443-53. Given these limitations, however, the National Commission conducted a
thorough investigation.
30. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
31. Although a few government officials attempted to justify the decision by arguing that
the acts would have been subject only to military jurisdiction at the time they were committed,
some of the president's closest advisors frankly acknowledge in public and private the political
nature of the decision. See Foster, After the Terror, Mother Jones, Feb./Mar. 1985, at 37
(comments of Presidential advisor Jaime Malamud).
32. Notwithstanding its celebrated rejection of the "following orders" defense, the Nurem-
berg trials provide only limited guidance for Argentina. In post-war Germany, the balance of
power between the accusers and the accused appeared far more conducive to a full investiga-
tion and punishment of the atrocities of the state, yet standards of guilt remained ill-defined
and few convictions resulted. The difficulties encountered at Nuremberg highlighted "the in-
adequacy of the prevailing legal system and of current judicial concepts to deal with the facts
of administrative massacres organized by the state apparatus." H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN
JERUSALEM 294 (1963). Thus, while Nuremberg represents a rare attempt to apply legal
norms to punish state terror, its invocation as a legal and historic precedent in the Argentine
context must be carefully qualified.
33. The current cycle of military coups began with the overthrow of President Hip6lito
Yrigoyen in 1930. In 1943, President Ram6n S. Castillo was overthrown in a military uprising
that included Colonel Juan D. Per6n. Per6n subsequently became president and was in turn
removed from office by a coup in 1955. In 1962, the military again intervened and deposed
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and whose aggregate tenure had since considerably outweighed that of
civilians. By vesting original jurisdiction in the military tribunals, the
government sought to avoid the military solidarity that might ensue if all
military personnel faced trials in civilian courts. Trials in the military
tribunals would, according to the government, allow a section of the
armed forces to condemn its own, and, in the process of purging itself of
the taint of the "dirty war," to repudiate the most culpable officials.34 In
terms of deterrence, criminal sanctions imposed by fellow military of-
ficers could, arguably, have a greater impact on future military conspira-
tors than those meted out by civilian courts, the latter being dismissable
as "revanchisme."
The government also believed that, as a practical matter, trials before
military tribunals offered the best possibility of ending the conspiracy of
silence which the institutional loyalty of the armed forces had created.
As the National Commission noted, Argentina "distinguished itself from
the methods employed in other countries by the total secrecy in which
[the repression] was carried out, the detention of persons following their
disappearance and the persistent official refusals to recognize the respon-
sibility of the intervening organisms."' 35 Testimony on the methods of
repression, except for isolated instances, came from the survivors and
was necessarily incomplete. A discovery process initiated within the
armed forces themselves could arguably help to reveal the source of ac-
tual orders and the direct chain of responsibility.
C. Law 23.049 and the Attack on Military Jurisdiction
The critical provisions of Law 23.049, which applies to government-
initiated prosecutions as well as to plaintiff-prosecutions, are contained in
Articles 10 and 11.36 In prosecutions fitting the descriptions given in Ar-
elected President Arturo Frondizi; another civilian government headed by President Arturo
Illia was allowed to take power. Illia was in turn overthrown in 1966 by the first of the "na-
tional security" dictatorships under the leadership of General Ongania. See J. Oc6N, His-
TORIA ARGENTINA 553-66 (1974). Finally, in 1976, the last dictatorship, actually a series of
three juntas, took power in a coup led by General Videla.
34. A leading government official described the armed forces as seventy percent bureau-
cratic (i.e., inclined to follow the lead of their superiors), fifteen percent fascist, and fifteen
percent "democratic" (i.e., in favor of civilian rule). The government's strategy was described
as a gamble that it could bolster the pro-civilian wing, rally the majority of the apolitical
bureaucracy to its side, and jettison the fascist right-wing. (record of conversation on file with
the Yale Journal of International Law.)
35. NUNCA MAs, supra note 1, at 16-17.
36. The most relevant sections of Law 23.049, promulgated February 14, 1984, provide as
follows:
Art. 10-The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces shall take jurisdiction, using the
summary proceedings in peacetime established by Articles 502 to 504 and related sections
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tile 10, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will utilize its rela-
tively expeditious "summary proceedings." Six months after the
initiation of its proceedings, the Supreme Council must report to the ci-
vilian Federal Chamber of Appeals the reasons for its failure to complete
the proceedings. The appellate court then has the option of returning
the case to the Supreme Council for a fixed period, requiring additional
progress reports, unless the court finds that there has been "unjustified
delay or negligence in the conduct of the trial," in which case the civilian
court shall "assume the conduct of the proceedings at whatever stage
they may be."'37 Neither Law 23.049 nor any other law prescribes the
procedures that the appellate court should use in the event it assumes
jurisdiction over a case.
Article 11 creates a defense for "acts committed by personnel . . .
who acted without decisionmaking capacity according to orders or direc-
tives pursuant to plans approved and supervised by the superior organic
command of the Armed Forces and by the military junta. '38 For such
of the Code of Military Justice, of the crimes committed prior to the effective date of this
law as to which:
1) The accused are military personnel of the Armed Forces and personnel of the secur-
ity, police and penal forces under operational control of the Armed Forces who acted
from March 24, 1976, to September 26, 1983, in the operations undertaken with the al-
leged motive of curbing terrorism, and
2) The acts would have been comprehended within the Code of Military Justice, Article
108, sections 2, 3, 4, or 5, under its previous text.
Appeal in such cases shall be to the Federal Chamber of Appeals [corresponding to the
area in which the case arose], using the requirements, parties and procedures established
in Article 445 below.
Upon the completion of six months after the initiation of proceedings, the Supreme
Council shall report to the Federal Chamber within the following five days the reasons
preventing it from reaching a conclusion. Such report shall be submitted to the parties so
that within three days thereafter they may make whatever observations or pleas they
deem pertinent, which shall be submitted with [the report].
The Federal Chamber may order the remission of the proceedings and fix a period for
the completion of the trial; if [the proceedings] are excessively voluminous or complex,
the Chamber shall indicate an additional period within which a new report shall issue in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
If the Chamber finds an unjustified delay or negligence in the conduct of the proceed-
ings, it shall assume jurisdiction of the proceedings at whatever stage the cases are en-
countered.
Art. 1 I-Article 34, section 5 of the Penal Code shall be interpreted in accordance with
the rule of Article 514 of the Code of Military Justice with respect to acts committed by
the personnel mentioned in the preceeding Article who acted without decision making
capacity according to orders or directives [issued] pursuant to plans approved and super-
vised by the superior organic command of the Armed Forces and by the military junta.
[In such cases] it shall be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that [the
act] was committed with inevitable reliance upon the legitimacy of the order received,
except when consisting in the commission of atrocious or aberrant acts.
37. Id. at art. 10.
38. Id. at art. 11.
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an act, "it shall be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that [the act] was committed with inevitable reliance upon the legitimacy
of the order received, except when consisting of the commission of atro-
cious or aberrant acts."' 39 The statute thus enacts the tripartite assign-
ment of responsibility advocated by the Alfonsin government: lower-
ranking officers who merely followed orders are to be absolved of crimi-
nal responsibility; high-ranking officials who gave the orders and lower-
ranking officers who committed excesses-either by exceeding the orders
or by obeying manifestly excessive and illegitimate orders-may be held
criminally responsible for their actions.
1. Practical Objections to Military Jurisdiction
It may not be immediately evident to foreign observers of the Argen-
tine experience why the human rights community and the plaintiff-prose-
cutors have so tenaciously resisted military jurisdiction. In order to
understand the basis of their objections, it is necessary to have some un-
derstanding of the nature of the Argentine criminal justice system.
Under Argentine criminal law, serious criminal acts (e.g., felonies) are
considered offenses against both the individual victim and society as a
whole. The fiscal must participate in criminal proceedings to represent
the interest of the state. Separate participation by the plaintiff-prosecutor
or his or her lawyer is optional, but may not be denied.4° The direct
participation of the victim is singularly valuable where the alleged crimes
were committed under the color of state authority. It can provide a use-
ful counterweight to the inevitable considerations of political expediency
occasioned by the subordination of thefiscal to the executive branch. The
querellante system, combined with the widespread representation of vic-
tims by the now-active human rights bar, has provided the central vehi-
cle for the introduction into the discovery process of the fruits of
research conducted by human rights groups during the dictatorship.
In contrast to the querellante system, the procedure of the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces effectively excludes any participation by
the plaintiff-prosecutors or their lawyers. Proceedings are held in secret
without the attendance of complainants and in accordance with strict
military rank. For instance, in Argentine civilian trials, when a contra-
diction in testimony occurs, the judge may order a face-to-face confron-
tation between the witnesses as well as question them directly.41
However, in the military tribunal, no such confrontation is permitted be-
tween a higher and a lower ranking officer, much less between an officer
39. Id.
40. See supra note 17.
41. C6digo de Procedimientos en Materia Penal, supra note 17, at arts. 309-315.
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and a soldier.42 Much critical evidence against the highest officers, in the
form of testimony by a very few "turncoat" military men of low rank,
thus cannot be verified or authenticated in the traditional manner of Ar-
gentine jurisprudence. 43
Most important, the nature of the judges differentiates military from
civilian trials. The military judiciary, as an integral part of the armed
forces, consists of active or retired high-ranking officers deeply imbued
with a sense of strict hierarchy and discipline and with an aggressive
esprit de corps. Furthermore, the Argentine military had supported, al-
most without dissent, the "battle against subversion" which spawned the
human rights violations.44 Human rights lawyers thus remained, at best,
highly skeptical of the willingness of the officers of the Supreme Council
to view objectively the evidence against their military colleagues, evi-
dence flatly denied by the accused officers and offered by civilians who
themselves had been fingered as "subversives" or who were tainted by
their relation to supposedly "subversive" victims.
The provision of Law 23.049 for civilian review of proceedings in the
Supreme Council does not resolve the difficulties. It is unclear whether
the plaintiff-prosecutors would be readmitted into the proceedings upon
the emergence of a case from the military tribunal. Further questions are
raised by the limitations of an appellate tribunal in dealing with an inade-
quate factual record. The Federal Chamber of Appeals, like an Ameri-
can appellate court, ordinarily deals with a closed factual record
assembled in the trial court below; it is not even physically equipped to
hear witnesses or take evidence. In addition, the law is silent on whether
or to what extent the court in these review proceedings could reconsider
evidence discounted-or available but not considered-by the military
tribunal.
The human rights lawyers representing plaintiff-prosecutors thus at-
tempted to avoid the transfer of jurisdiction. The legal argument against
military jurisdiction proceeded along two fronts: a narrow construction
of the statutory language describing the class of cases to which the law
applies, and a direct attack on the constitutionality of military jurisdic-
tion in these cases.
42. C6digo de Justicia Militar, supra note 24, at art. 288.
43. In some respects, however, military procedure may favor conviction. Various proce-
dural protections for the defendant are curtailed. Furthermore, in civilian court, criminal con-
viction must be supported by "legal proof": the court must explain its evaluation of the
evidence, following certain statutory guidelines. See, eg., C6digo de Procedimientos en
Materia Penal, supra note 17, at arts. 305-308, 316, 346, 352, 357-58. Military tribunals may
use "free conviction": they need not justify their decision to convict or follow any particular
standards in weighing the evidence. See C6digo de Justicia Militar, supra note 24, at arts. 360,
392.
44. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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2. Narrowly Construing the Scope of Military Jurisdiction
In any individual case, the government bases the assertion of military
jurisdiction upon Article 10 of Law 23.049. Article 10, in turn, requires
both that the acts have been committed between March 24, 1976, and
September 26, 1983, "with the alleged motive of curbing terrorism," and
that these acts fall within the ambit of Article 108 as it stood at the time
the acts were committed. Until Article 108 was amended by 23.049, 45 it
provided for military jurisdiction if the alleged crime was either an "act
of service" or an act committed "in a place subject to exclusive military
authority."'46
The plaintiff-prosecutors denied that the abduction and "disappear-
ance" of civilians not formally accused of any crime could ever be
deemed an "act of service." Furthermore, in many cases, neither the site
of the abduction nor the place of detention could be considered subject to
exclusive military authority, inasmuch as the latter had often not been
lawfully conveyed to the military. However, by attempting to prove the
responsibility of the army and some of its highest ranking officers in the
crimes, the plaintiffs often undermined their arguments concerning the
application of Law 23.049. 47 Law 23.049 also imposes limitations with
respect to the date of the acts covered. In most cases involving disap-
peared persons, the primary crime charged was "illegitimate deprivation
of liberty." The plaintiff-prosecutors thus argued, in the many cases
where the victim was still missing, that the crime was a continuing one
that fell outside of the dates specified by Article 10.48
In several cases, civilian trial courts avoided consideration of any con-
stitutional issues by rejecting the fiscal's motion to transfer jurisdiction
on the grounds that Law 23.049, narrowly construed, did not apply.
49
The Supreme Court rejected some arguments for a narrow reading of
Law 23.049 in the only plaintiff-prosecution it has yet considered, the
45. Article 1 of Law 23.049 amended and narrowed the peacetime scope of Article 108 and
thus military jurisdiction with respect to subsequent acts.
46. C6digo de Justicia Militar, supra note 24, art. 108, §2.
47. In the Giorgi case, supra note 3, the lawyers also argued that his detention was not
undertaken "with the alleged motive of curbing terrorism," as required by Law 23.049. See
supra note 36. Giorgi had never been charged with any crime. Furthermore, the law uses a
particularly narrow definition of the word "terrorism." In common usage, terrorism implies
an element of violence in addition to the purely political opposition which the military called
"subversive."
48. See supra note 36. Thefiscal responded to this argument in the Giorgi case, supra note
3, by suggesting that, since Giorgi could certainly not still be in a clandestine detention center,
it was more logical to presume that the "illegitimate deprivation of liberty" had ended. The
fiscal thus suggested that Giorgi had died or been released within the dates specified by Law
23.049.
49. For example, in a decision issued on March 24, 1984, the judge in the Giorgi case,
supra note 3, accepted the plaintiff's argument that Law 23.049 did not apply due to the con-
tinuing nature of the offense.
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Bignone case, which involved the disappearance of two conscripts.50 The
military status of the victims made the Bignone case a less problematic
one for military jurisdiction and neatly distinguishable in several respects
from the typical plaintiff-prosecution. The Supreme Court has pending
before it numerous such cases which raise not only more substantial stat-
utory construction arguments but also more weighty constitutional con-
cerns than were present in Bignone.
3. The Constitutional Attack on Military Jurisdiction
The decision to vest original jurisdiction in the military tribunals cre-
ated the first serious constitutional conflict for the restored civilian gov-
ernnent. The Argentine constitution is based upon eighteenth century
constitutionalism, primarily the United States Constitution and the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man. Its constitutional jurispru-
dence draws heavily upon U.S. constitutional law.51 In particular, all leg-
islation is subordinated to the Constitution and the judiciary is
empowered to review and strike down unconstitutional legislation. 52
Consequently, the judicial forum became an important test site for a con-
stitutional attack upon the government's decision to divest civilian courts
of their customary jurisdiction over common crimes committed against
non-military persons.
a. The Issues
The numerous plaintiff-prosecutors seeking to avoid military juris-
diction directed a series of constitutional attacks upon Law 23.049. They
based the first of these challenges upon Article 16 of the Argentine Con-
stitution, which incorporates both an equal protection clause and a
prohibition on privileged judicial treatment (fueros personales) for identi-
fiable social groups or persons. In the landmark Espina case,53 the
Supreme Court applied Article 16 to repudiate special judicial treatment
for military officials. In ruling that military officers involved in an abor-
tive insurrection led by Colonel Mariano Espina could not avoid military
jurisdiction, the Court stated: "Military laws are exceptional laws in that
they govern military states, states of war and relations between individu-
als who form part of the army and navy of the nation."'54 The Court
further declared that, as of independence from Spain and the ratification
of the Constitution in 1853,
50. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
51. J. GONZALEZ, MANUAL DE LA CONSTrTUcI6N ARGENTINA 37-38 (1983).
52. Id. at 574.
53. Coronel Mariano Espina, 54 Fallos 577 (1893).
54. Id. at 585.
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... no military officer any longer enjoys the privilege of being tried before
military tribunals for reasons of his status, that is, because of his military
character or as a member of the army, in civil cases or for crimes that do
not implicate a violation of the [military] ordinance, and the trial of which
falls under the competence of other tribunals according to the nature of said
crimes.
Therefore, the jurisdiction of the courts-martial or of the military tribunals
in all cases that implicate an uprising of troops or of individuals of the army
has not been established for purely personal reasons, derived from the mili-
tary character of the delinquents, but rather by reason of the law that was
infringed. .... 55
Since the crimes committed during the dictatorship corresponded to
sanctionable criminal offenses such as kidnapping, battery, homicide, and
illegitimate deprivation of liberty, and since the offenses charged did not
constitute a violation of military discipline, the establishment of special
forums for the alleged commission of these crimes by military officials
creates a direct confrontation with the prohibitions of Article 16 as inter-
preted in Espina.
The identical result is reached through an inquiry into the components
of a military offense. Traditional Argentine jurisprudence requires two
elements for criminal proceedings to fall within the ambit of military ju-
risdiction. First, the alleged infraction must have been committed by a
military official and, second, the offense in question must constitute a
violation of military duty. As two leading commentators on Argentine
criminal law have concluded, "as a result of being an infraction of mili-
tary duty, [the offense] should be treated under the purview of military
jurisdiction. '5 6 Since no human rights prosecution suggested that any
officer was delinquent in the discharge of military duties, the critical sec-
ond requirement for military jurisdiction is absent.
The remaining constitutional arguments revolve around the concept of
the "natural judge" derived from the due process guarantees of Article
18 57 the creation of constitutional courts by Article 94,58 and the vesting
55. Id at 589 (emphasis added).
56. F. ZAFFARONI & R. CABALLERO, DERECHO PENAL MILITAR 27-28 (1980). There is
more than a touch of irony in the proposal of the restored civilian authority to redirect civilian
legal claims back to the same military tribunals that were the ultimate arbiters during the de
facto government.
57. "No inhabitant of the nation may be condemned without a prior trial based upon laws
predating the facts at trial, nor tried by special commissions, nor removed from the judges
designated by the law [existing] before the fact of the case." CoNsTrruCI6N DE LA NACI6N
ARGENTINA [hereinafter cited as CONSTrTUcI6N], art. 18.
58. "The Judicial Power of the Nation shall be exercised by a Supreme Court of Justice
and by such inferior tribunals as Congress shall establish in the territory of the Nation." CON-
srruci6N, art. 58.
133
Yale Journal of International Law
of jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution and national
statutes by Article 100.59 As the Supreme Court stated in the Severo
Chumbita case:6°
the object of Article 18 of the Constitution has been to proscribe ex post
facto laws and trials by commissions especially named for that case, taking
the acccused out of the permanent jurisdiction of natural judges in order to
be submitted to accidental or circumstantial tribunals or judges.61
Although due process arguments in the criminal context are generally
reserved for criminal defendants, the state action involved in the harms
suffered by the victims suggests that the Court's holding should also ap-
ply to plaintiff-prosecutors. The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared,
most recently in the case of Bignone,62 that guarantees of access to the
constitutionally prescribed judicial forum under Article 18 extend to
both plaintiff-prosecutors and the accused; "since there is no justification
for different treatment among those who claim .a legal right...
The due process claims of the plaintiff-prosecutors derive from the fact
that military tribunals are not constitutional courts within the meaning
of Articles 94 and 100 of the Constitution. 4 Rather, they are considered
administrative tribunals created by Congress pursuant to Article 67, sec-
tion 23, which empowers Congress to establish regulations for the gov-
ernance of the military.65 The plaintiff-prosecutors, therefore, claim that
the requirement that they pursue their claims in administrative tribunals
violates both Article 18, whose equal protection clause ensures access to
constitutional courts, and Article 100, which grants to the federal courts
jurisdiction over all cases in which the federal government is a party. The
unavailability of the federal judicial forum specifically authorized to ad-
judicate constitutional claims thus constitutes a denial of due process and
equal protection to the plaintiff-prosecutor. 66 The denial of any role in
59. "[It shall] correspond to the Supreme Court and the inferior tribunals of the Nation
the knowledge and decision of all cases based upon points governed by the Constitution and by
the laws of the Nation. . ." CoNsTrrUCI6N, art. 100.
60. 17 Fallos 22 (1875).
61. Id at 38.
62. [1984] C La Ley 258. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
63. Id at 571. See also Andr~s Alfredo Julio, 299 Fallos 17, 18 (1977) (Article 18 of the
Constitution grants the right "to all persons recognized by law to act at trial in defense of their
rights, be they under character of querellante or defendant").
64. See Coronel Don Angel de Hernandez, 149 Fallos 175 (1926); G. BIDART CAMPOS,
THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT 97 (1982) (military tribunals not part of constitutional
courts). See also J. GoNzALEZ, supra note 51, at 631 ("the forum for the trial of a military
official is not a personal forum, but rather a true forum or one based on the cause of action, as
provided for by Article 16" (emphasis original)).
65. Herndndez, 149 Fallos at 175; J. GONZALEZ, supra note 64, at 629-34.
66. See F.ZAEARONI & R. CABALLERO, supra note 56, at 67 ("military officials who com-
mit common crimes that do not affect national defense not only remain outside of military
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the prosecutions to a plaintiff-prosecutor under the procedural norms of
military justice further aggravates this constitutional difficulty.
The acts covered by Law 23.049 do not involve breaches of military
discipline or failures to act in conformity with military duty. Rather,
they involve accusations of criminal activity directed at the civilian popu-
lation. Consequently, Law 23.049 forces civilians seeking redress for the
crimes of the dictatorship to present themselves, in the first instance,
before military tribunals, despite the absence of the established prerequi-
sites for military jurisdiction.
The question of the appropriateness of military tribunal jurisdiction
over crimes involving civilians has generally been posed in the context of
the criminal prosecution of civilians by military courts. Despite the his-
toric instability of Argentine constitutional government over the past
half-century, the federal courts, and, in particular, the Supreme Court,
have attempted to restrict the reach of military tribunals over civilians. 67
In Arancibia Clavel,68 for instance, the Court declared, "the submission
of civilians to military tribunals requires an exceptional situation as well
as an explicit decision of the political power to alter, for this grave rea-
son, the normal order of competency."' 69 The leading Supreme Court
cases upholding military trials of civilians during the last dictatorship
have all turned upon an acceptance of the legitimacy of the political
proclamation of an "emergency" situation.70 While acquiescing in the
declaration of a state of emergency, the Court has disallowed sentences
once the state of emergency had passed, thereby recognizing the limited
scope of military jurisdiction over civilians. 71
Although Law 23.049 is concerned with the prosecution of military
officials rather than civilians, the questions posed are nonetheless related.
Because of the role of the querellante system, the constitutional guaran-
tees of access to the appropriate judicial forum apply both to the defend-
ant and to the victim and his or her representative. Thus the claims of a
civilian forced to appear as a defendant before a military court are simi-
lar to those of a plaintiff-prosecutor obligated to seek legal redress
outside of the constitutional courts, in this case in the Supreme Council.
criminal law but also outside of civilian criminal law under military jurisdiction; they fall
under the rule of common criminal law applicable by civilian tribunals").
67. See G. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 64, at 95-98.
68. 302 Fallos 973 (1980).
69. Id. at 973-74.
70. See Carlos Isidoro Weinzettel, 302 Fallos 1626 (1980); Jorge Emilio Papetti y Otros,
301 Fallos 419, [1979] C La Ley 155 (1979); Horacio Oscar Saragovi, 300 Fallos 1173, [1979]
A La Ley 501 (1978).
71. Cf . BIDART CAMpOS, supra note 64, at 101.
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The use of military jurisdiction in these cases signals a departure from
traditional Argentine jurisprudence. Law 23.049 has the paradoxical ef-
fect of expanding military jurisdiction at a time when the civilian govern-
ment is attempting to consolidate its power over the military as an
institution. By placing the final legal responsibility for the crimes of the
dictatorship outside the constitutionally prescribed judicial power, the
Alfonsin government sacrificed an important opportunity in the cam-
paign to reestablish the rule of law, relying instead upon a political calcu-
lation to avoid a direct confrontation between the armed forces and the
civilian judiciary.
b. The Bignone Decision
The district and appellate courts that have confronted the constitu-
tional issues raised by Law 23.049 have reached contrary conclusions, as
in the case of Bignone. Bignone was a criminal action brought by the
relatives of three disappeared conscripts, Luis Garcia, Luis Steimberg,
and Mari6n Molffm, against their commanding officer, General Reynaldo
B.A. Bignone. In the district court, Judge Oliveri declared Law 23.049
unconstitutional. This decision was, however, reversed on appeal.72
The Supreme Court then heard the case. In a three-to-two decision, 73
the Court upheld Law 23.049. 74 Chief Justice Carrio concluded that the
appellate review provisions and the time limitations imposed by the mili-
tary tribunals for deliberations were sufficient for the law to withstand
constitutional scrutiny on its face. The Court relied upon the doctrine of
Fletcher v. Peck,75 holding that, where reasonable doubts exist concern-
ing the validity of challenged legislation, courts should uphold such legis-
lation.76 Moreover, the necessary concurring opinion of Justice Petracchi
relied, at least in part, on the military service of both the conscript-com-
plainants and the defendant in upholding the constitutionality of military
jurisdiction.77 The Bignone decision thus left open both the scope and the
constitutionality of military jurisdiction in cases involving the claims of
civilians.
c. The Videla Decision
In its last opinion before the January-February 1985 summer recess,
72. [1984] C La Ley 258. At least four cases, including Giorgi, supra note 3, are now
pending in the Supreme Court on this issue.
73. The dissenting judges challenged the procedural posture of the case as an emergency
appeal. Id. at 275.
74. [1984] C La Ley 258 (1984).
75. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
76. [1984] C La Ley 258, 266.
77. Id. at 269 (Petracchi, J., concurring).
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the Supreme Court confronted a claim which was the converse of that
raised by the victims. Following the refusal of the Supreme Council to
indict the former junta members and the civilian court's assumption of
jurisdiction,7 General Jorge Rafael Videla challenged the constitutional-
ity of civilian appellate court review of decisions of military tribunals.
General Videla argued that he was entitled to be tried by a military tribu-
nal for two reasons: first, he claimed that the military judges were his
"natural judges," and second, he asserted that he could only have been
subject to military jurisdiction at the time the acts were committed.79
The Court rejected the argument that the constitutional principle of
perpetuatiojurisdictionis precluded civilian jurisdiction, at least when the
case was on appeal from the military tribunal. The Court conceded to
the military the right to "invoke as natural judges the organs of military
jurisdiction for those offenses whose modalities authorize their inclusion
within military competence," 80 but refused to strike down non-military
jurisdiction for other crimes. As in Bignone, the Court did not reach the
constitutionality of the adjudication of crimes against civilians in military
tribunals.
Ironically, the Court's decision upholding civilian appellate jurisdic-
tion in the Videla case relied upon arguments virtually indistinguishable
from those raised and rejected in the cases upholding original military
jurisdiction over human rights cases. For example, the Court concluded
that members of the armed forces could claim the military tribunals as
their natural judges only in offenses concerning military personnel. It
would appear, then, that for offenses not essentially military, i.e. against
civilians, 81 the military's constitutionally mandated natural judges would
consist of the civilian judiciary. The lawyers of the plaintiff-prosecutors
who are resisting military jurisdiction and challenging the constitutional-
ity of Law 23.049 from that perspective, of course, have raised this argu-
ment in numerous cases. It would be difficult for the Court to uphold
military jurisdiction in pending cases without facing this serious
contradiction.
However, the Supreme Court, all of whose members were appointed
by President Alfonsin, has been exceedingly attentive to political con-
siderations not easily reconcilable with strict legal reasoning. Judging
from its decisions in the Bignone and Videla cases, the Court appears to
view the provisions of Law 23.049 as a necessary political compromise
with the military, one that should not be subjected to rigorous constitu-
78. See infra notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
79. Jorge Rafael Videla, C. No. 389.x.x., slip op. at 39 (Dec. 27, 1984). (Caballero, J.,
concurring).
80. Id. at 19.
81. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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tional analysis. This outlook may be understood in light of the historical
instability of Argentine constitutional rule and precedent: the Court, like
the government, appears to have concluded that the need to secure polit-
ical stability overrides the need to uphold the strict rule of law, and that
the compromise embodied in Law 23.049 is a viable means of assuring
this goal.
D. The Realities of Military Jurisdiction
Although Law 23.049 was not passed until February 1984, and the
diversion of private prosecutions from civilian courts to the military tri-
bunal was slower than anticipated, the Supreme Council has had ample
time to demonstrate its approach to the human rights prosecutions. In
December 1983, the government initiated prosecutions in the Supreme
Council of the nine former junta members, and, shortly thereafter, ad-
ded the prosecutions of former Buenos Aires police chief, General Ra-
m6n Camps, and a handful of other high ranking officers. After one year
of these proceedings, no indictments have been issued. The Supreme
Council has resisted the role which the government assigned it, and, in
the process, produced a serious setback for the government's human
rights policy.
1. Developments in the Supreme Council
By June 1984, at the conclusion of the first six-month period of mili-
tary jurisdiction for the first nine prosecutions, 82 the Council had not
taken initial declarations from all of the accused. Those who had made
declarations had apparently not faced any detailed interrogation. For ex-
ample, six former junta members testified before the Council on their
roles in the "battle against subversion" in a single day. 83 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Council raised hopes that it might exercise a degree of inde-
pendence when it ordered the "rigorous preventive detention" of Ruben
Chammorro, former head of the torture and concentration camp of the
Navy Mechanical School (Escuela Mec~nica de la Armada, or ESMA),84
and ruled against motions by General Camps to invalidate the govern-
mental decree ordering Camp's arrest, detention, and trial.85
The Federal Chamber of Appeals, faced with this mixed progress,
granted a ninety day extension to the Supreme Council in July 1984.86
Although it found no unjustifiable delay or negligence such as would
82. See supra note 36, at art. 10.
83. La Prensa, Feb. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
84. La Prensa, Mar. 23, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
85. La Prensa, Mar. 29, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
86. La Prensa, July 13, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
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merit its taking over the cases,8 7 the Chamber did require the Supreme
Council to submit within thirty days a report of its progress, not only in
the initial nine prosecutions, but in all the human rights cases under its
jurisdiction at that time. In August, after receiving the latest report of the
Supreme Council, the Chamber of Appeals granted an additional exten-
sion. 8 It expressed concern that only two of the accused--Generals
Jorge Rafael Videla and Orlando Ram6n Agosti, both of the first junta-
had actually been interrogated. Although the Council's work was
deemed "incomplete," the Chamber refused to take over jurisdiction. In-
stead, it fixed October 11, 1984 as the new deadline, at which point it was
anticipated that, in the absence of significant progress, the Chamber
would assume responsibility for the proceedings against the nine former
junta members.
For a brief period, the Supreme Council appeared to heed the concerns
of the Chamber. On August 26, only days after the second extension was
granted, the Council ordered the arrest of General Luciano Benjamin
Men6ndez,89 former head of the Third Army Corps, which was responsi-
ble for the province of C6rdoba, a center of the most extreme repres-
sion.90 Days later, the Council ordered the "rigorous preventive
detention" of Men6ndez, as well as that of Emilio Eduardo Massera, a
member of the first junta.91
In the midst of the proceedings in these cases, on September 20, the
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons submitted its re-
port to President Alfonsin, further raising expectations for immediate ac-
tion against the highest ranking military officials. The report's prologue,
released to the press that day, declared with unmistakable clarity that the
more than nine thousand documented disappearances 92 were the work of
a repressive structure coordinated from the highest levels of the armed
forces and various police and security forces down to hundreds of indi-
vidual police precincts and military task forces.93 The prologue stated
that even the worst abuses of human rights constituted an integral part of
the repressive methodology for which the armed forces bore institutional
responsibility.
In assigning institutional responsibility for human rights abuses to the
armed forces, the report discredited the government's attempt to focus
responsibility on a handful of commanding officers and notorious indi-
87. See supra note 36, at art. 10.
88. La Prensa, Aug. 24, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
89. La Prensa, Aug. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
90. See generally NUNCA MAs, supra note 1, at 200-08.
91. La Prensa, Aug. 30, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
92. See supra note 2.
93. See NUNCA MAs, supra note 1, at 7-11 (prologue presented publicly on Sept. 20, 1984).
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viduals. The government's strategy received a severe setback five days
later, when the Supreme Council issued a report, in anticipation of the
October 11 deadline, declaring its inability and unwillingness to complete
proceedings against the junta members.94 The content of the document
left little doubt that the Supreme Council had chosen to close ranks be-
hind its colleagues at the risk of an open confrontation with its new con-
stitutional commander-in-chief.
2. The Report of the Supreme Council
The Supreme Council's provocative declaration contained a number of
legal propositions which confirmed the unwillingness of the military tri-
bunal to assess the evidence objectively and issue a verdict free of preju-
dice. First, the Supreme Council declared that it had reviewed all the
orders and decrees issued in the "battle against subversion" and found
them wholly unobjectionable; the commanders could be found culpable,
if at all, only in failing to exercise adequate supervision over their subor-
dinates in order to prevent possible excesses.95 The Council expressed
great doubt concerning the likelihood of proving such excesses. First,
the Council stated that the most typical charge, "illegitimate deprivation
of liberty," could only be proved if it were first demonstrated that the
alleged victim had not actually engaged in "subversive" activities; it ap-
peared to the Council that most had.96 The Council's report thus sug-
gested that an individual with "subversive" connections-e.g.,
membership in a leftist political group-was not entitled to procedural
due process rights such as formal arrest, notification of the charges, and a
fair trial, but was properly subject to summary "disappearance."
Second, the Supreme Council cast a blanket aspersion on the credibil-
ity of all those tainted by charges of subversion. Thus, the Council stated
that the specific allegations of torture and detention in clandestine con-
centration camps were particularly difficult to investigate in light of what
it saw as the biased nature of the witnesses. Most such witnesses were
themselves once held by the military as "subversives" or were relatives of
such "subversives;" therefore, according to the Council, "their credibility
[was] only relative."' 97 Furthermore, the Council stated that certain con-
sistencies in the testimony of these observers as to the pattern followed
upon abduction of an individual and the nature of the torture methods
used suggested that the witnesses had previously agreed among them-
selves on the content of their testimony.98 The Council thus viewed con-
94. La Prensa, Sept. 26, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
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sistent testimony paralleling that submitted to the National Commission
not as a confirmation of the accuracy of such accounts, nor as evidence of
a uniform, coordinated methodology of, but as a sign of an anti-military
conspiracy utilizing deliberate falsification. Finally, the Council paid
tribute to the importance of discipline, hierarchy, and obedience to the
orders of superior officers. 99
The public reacted with dismay to the Council's statement, and the
press featured overwhelmingly critical commentary by political leaders,
lawyers, human rights activists, and other observers. 100 A group of
plaintiff-prosecutors petitioned the Supreme Court to irntervene and in-
validate Law 23.049 on the basis of the prejudgment manifested in the
Council's report. The Council responded by sending a letter to the De-
fense Minister in November complaining of the criticism and, in essence,
requesting his intervention to stop what it regarded as scurrilous attacks
in the press. 10 1 Defense Minister Raul Borras responded with a brief let-
ter explaining that, under the constitutional government, freedom of
speech and press prevailed, and that the members of the Council, like all
citizens, retained their right to proceed legally against those whose criti-
cism they considered defamatory.10 2 Within two weeks, the entire mem-
bership of the Supreme Council resigned en masse in protest against what
they regarded as disrespectful treatment by the press, the public gener-
ally, and the Defense Ministry. 10 3
3. The Civilian Court's Response
As of January 1984, the government was still formulating a policy
which would resurrect the Supreme Council and the strategy in which it
played a key role. In the meantime, the Federal Chamber of Appeals
acted decisively after its October 1984 decision to take over the proceed-
ings against the first nine junta members, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Law 23.049.104 The court implicated the nine former junta
members individually as to their responsibility in the "battle against sub-
version." It placed five of the former members under "rigorous preven-
tive detention" and required the other four to remain at the disposition of
the court for further proceedings.105
As of May 1985, the fiscal associated with the Federal Chamber of
Appeals has been aggressively collecting and presenting evidence, and
99. Id. at 4, col. 3.
100. See, eg., La Prensa, Sept. 28, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
101. La Naci6n, Nov. 10, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
102. Id.
103. La Naci6n, Nov. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
104. See Clarin, Oct. 5, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
105. La Prensa, Oct. 5, 1984, at 5, col. 5.
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the court appears to be conscientiously fulfilling its duty to assess the
evidence and to issue decisions in accordance with that evidence. The
court issued several indictments early in 1985 and public trials began in
April.10 6
E. The Politics of Military Jurisdiction Reconsidered
The decision to place in the hands of the military itself the prosecution
of human rights abuses was a gamble. The Alfonsin government hoped
that the Supreme Council-and the vast majority of the armed forces not
directly involved in the human rights violations-would sacrifice a hand-
ful of military officers in order to help rebuild the integrity and prestige
of the armed forces as an institution with a role in the new constitutional
order. This gamble was based on an empirical assessment of the nature of
the armed forces as a largely bureaucratic institution flanked by a small
fascistic fringe and a small democratic sector107 . The government be-
lieved that a condemnation by the prestigious Supreme Council of the
methodology of the repression and its underlying ideology would isolate
the fascist elements and push the large bureaucratic center toward alli-
ance with the the more democratic forces within the military.
However, this entire strategy is plagued by a basic contradiction be-
tween the political task at hand-the reestablishment of the rule of law
and of civilian control over the military-and the means chosen to carry
out that task, namely removal of the human rights prosecutions from the
civilian court system and the establishment of a set of special rules by
which military personnel need answer in the first instance only to the
military itself. The reestablishment of constitutional government must
encompass the resurrection of an independent system of justice to which
individual citizens can turn for redress of their grievances against govern-
ment officials, military personnel, or any other citizens. Yet, in the name
of the survival of the constitutional system itself, the government utilized
a measure designed to limit access to the court system and to shield from
the full force of civilian criminal sanctions most of those responsible for
human rights abuses. The government thus hoped to trade off the legiti-
106. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, at 2, col. 3 (nine former junta members on trial in Federal
Chamber of Appeals). The prosecutions initiated by the plaintiff-prosecutors lag behind the
prosecutions of the junta members which the government initiated. The plaintiff-prosecutions
fall into two groups. The first comprises those cases, at varying stages of the appeal process,
challenging the application of military jurisdiction. The second group consists of those cases
that have been transferred to the Supreme Council and whose transfer has not been appealed.
The cases in the latter group are currently passing through the six-month period of exclusive
military jurisdiction before review by the civilian Chamber of Appeals to determine whether
they should be removed to the civilian courts.
107. See supra note 34.
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mate claims of many victims for a return to stability and a subordinated
military. In so doing, the government's policy has proved profoundly
anti-legal in its conception, casting aside the painstaking application of
legal standards to concrete facts in favor of a political calculus, and
obfuscating the fact that each case of disappearance represents an indi-
vidual, identifiable victim and a set of individual perpetrators. In the or-
dinary workings of a criminal justice system, the degree of culpability of
the individual criminals would be reviewed in the context of a prosecu-
tion. Yet the government's approach rejects the application of criminal
justice to each perpetrator in favor of the political prosecutions of those
high-ranking officials who held overall responsibility. Moreover, the
political calculus itself contains a major flaw: the government cannot
impress upon the military its newly subordinate position in the constitu-
tional order without subjecting it in these most extraordinary cases to
civilian tribunals.
Nevertheless, the government's policy must also be evaluated on its
own terms. While a policy that sacrifices the potential legal redress of
just claims of victims bears a very heavy burden of justification, the suc-
cess of such a policy in helping to democratize, or at least domesticate,
the military and to secure a long term of constitutional rule in Argentina
would be a major accomplishment.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence to suggest that the military has
learned any lessons. The desired repudiation of the "dirty war" by the
armed forces has not occurred. One little-recognized sign of failure is the
virtual absence of military figures willing to testify against their col-
leagues concerning the practices of the "dirty war." Only about a dozen
of the thousands of military personnel with knowledge of the human
rights abuses have ever come forward to the press, the National Commis-
sion, or the courts to provide evidence and to repudiate those abuses.
This reluctance alone suggests that the government has misjudged the
political composition of the armed forces and has not succeeded in turn-
ing the majority of the military against the repressive practices of the
past.
The attitude of the Supreme Council itself raises greater concerns. Its
refusal to proceed against the ex-junta members constitutes an endorse-
ment of the basic goals and strategies of the "war against subversion"
and indeed of the national security ideology that thoroughly animated
the "war." According to that ideology, the State, as the self-appointed
guardian of "Western and Christian" values, has a right to self-preserva-
tion that is superior to the rights of any individuals. It considers all those
who seek to alter the nature of the state or question its values, e.g., Coin-
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munists, socialists, labor activists, leftists of any kind, or their sympathiz-
ers, to be "subversives" or "terrorists," deserving of no political or legal
rights. 10  As General Videla once explained to a journalist, "terrorism is
considered to be not only to kill with a weapon or to throw a bomb, but
also to activate others according to ideas contrary to our Western and
Christian civilization." 10 9 According to another general, "ingenuousness
and indifference imply complicity in subversion."' 10 As for these subver-
sives, "ideologically, they have lost the honor of calling themselves Ar-
gentine." 1 ' The disappearances, torture, and killing became almost
comprehensible in light of the world view expressed by these leading
generals. In its refusal to recognize any "illegitimate deprivation of lib-
erty" where the victim was involved in "subversive" activity, and its
blanket impugnation of the credibility of thousands of witnesses, the
Supreme Council's declaration approaches a juridicial affirmation of the
national security ideology.
If the sentiments of the Supreme Council are any indication, the Ar-
gentine military as an institution has proved more deeply anti-democratic
and supportive of the goals and methods of the prior dictatorship than
the government had calculated. As a result, the concession of original
jurisdiction over human rights prosecutions to the Supreme Council has
produced, not the isolation of the most reactionary forces, but rather, a
vindication emanating from the highest and most prestigious levels of the
military hierarchy.
III. Moral Responsibility and Military Hierarchy
The diversion of prosecutions from civilian to military tribunals consti-
tuted only the first element of the government's political decision to
shield the military from the onslaught of plaintiff-prosecutions. A second
fundamental aspect of the government's cautious policy toward the
human rights abuses concerns the availability to subordinate military or
police officials of the affirmative defense that they were merely "following
orders" in committing certain acts.
A. Law 23.049 and the Duty of Disobedience
If the government succeeds in interposing a "following orders" defense
for acts of repression, Argentine law and society will face a crisis of mo-
rality. In each case in which a court accepts such a defense, a new stan-
108. See D.FRONTALINI AND M. CAIAn, EL Mrro DE LA GUERRA SUCIA 21-26 (1984).
109. Id. at 24.
110. Id at 25.
111. Id at 22.
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dard for the exculpation of human rights violations will emerge. Yet the
language of the affirmative defense provided in Law 23.049, if strictly
interpreted, should shield from criminal responsibility only a small
number of defendants who participated directly in the torture and mur-
der of civilians in the "battle against subversion." Law 23.049 provides
that, for acts committed pursuant to orders by subordinate military per-
sonnel without decision-making authority, "it shall be presumed, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that [such acts] were committed in
inevitable reliance upon the legitimacy of the order received, except when
consisting in the commission of atrocious or aberrant acts." 112 In the
case most favorable to the defense of a subordinate officer whom the evi-
dence suggests engaged in torture, the officer would offer proof that he
had received a direct order to torture a particular individual. However,
the refusal of the military to yield its files and the virtually unbroken
code of silence among the military renders it almost impossible in most
cases to prove that such an order was given. Moreover, even if evidence
of such an order surfaced, it seems clear that the commission of torture is
an "atrocious or aberrant act" which f4ls outside the "following orders"
defense.
In most cases, the order received by the subordinate officer will have
been a relatively ambiguous one, e.g., to "extract all necessary informa-
tion-in the manner most expedient under the circumstances." For exam-
ple, in April 1977, General Roberto Eduardo Viola, then head of the
First Army Corps and later head of the second junta, issued Directive
504/77, concerning the industrial front of the anti-subversive cam-
paign.113 The detailed directive concerning goals, strategy, and execution
of the campaign contained the following order: "Eradicate the subversive
elements, employing the method that in each case is most expedient for
the success of the operation." 114 No evidence has come to light of any
more explicit directives which might have served as the basis for the ab-
duction, torture, detention, or execution of any particular person. As-
suming, therefore, that General Viola's order was typical of the directives
of the highest officers, the question becomes whether the implicit authori-
zation of repressive acts should be allowed to relieve those who commit-
ted such acts of criminal and moral responsibility.
Under the elements of criminal responsibility contained in Law 23.049,
two distinct arguments can be advanced for affirming the culpability of
the subordinate officials who acted pursuant to instructions such as these.
112. See supra note 36, at art. 11.
113. La Prensa, July 23, 1984, at 5, col. 4.
114. Id.
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First, it may be maintained that broad-gauge directives are insufficiently
precise to permit the "following orders" defense to be raised. Even if acts
such as torture or summary execution might be legally condoned if per-
formed in strict conformity with the dictates of the military hierarchy,
there must still be a threshhold of military compulsion before a society
may remove such acts from the spectrum of punishable offenses. Under
this analysis, the individual perpetrator must have lacked the element of
volition and must instead have been transformed into a coerced actor.
The defense thus fails as a consequence of the broad language of Viola's
directive, since its open-endedness restores to the subordinate officer the
critical elements of discretion and volition.
Alternatively, it may be assumed that, in the context of the institu-
tional establishment of concentration camps and torture centers, a direc-
tive such as Viola's was indeed sufficiently specific to be understood as
directing the commission of a series of criminal acts. Even in this case,
the "following orders" defense established by Law 23.049 requires both
that the orders be executed in good faith and that such orders not require
the commission of inherently "atrocious and aberrant" acts. These two
elements are logically linked, since the more atrocious an act, the less
likely the possibility of a good faith belief in its validity. Thus, even ac-
cepting the inevitability of some form of "following orders" defense, the
defense cannot be readily applied to the extra-legal and vicious acts com-
mitted by the Argentine dictatorship.
A reading of Law 23.049 which preserves the culpability of the vast
majority of direct participants in the human rights abuses receives addi-
tional support from the Argentine military doctrine of the duty of disobe-
dience. Under this doctrine, the subordinate officer or soldier who
receives an order retains a duty to ascertain its validity and authorization
and a concomitant duty to disobey any manifestly illegitimate order, i.e.
one contrary to criminal and constitutional standards of conduct.I1 5 An
order to abduct, torture, imprison, or kill civilians never arrested or tried
clearly constitutes an illegitimate command under this standard.
Fairly construed, Law 23.049 and preexisting military law governing
the "following orders" defense actually frustrate the government's effort
to shield from criminal responsibility the majority of those involved in
human rights abuses. This is because that effort rests upon a distinction
115. Mantaras, El Cddigo Militar establece la "desobediencia debida," El Periodista, Dec.
15-21, 1984, at 2; 2 TERAN LOMAS, DERECHO PENAL 184 (1980) (no duty to obey patently
atrocious or criminal order); see also I MANIGOT, C6DIGO PENAL DE LA NAc16N ARGEN-
TINA 110 (1978) (superior and subordinate both responsible for execution of a clearly criminal
order).
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between a majority who merely "followed orders" and a minority who
committed "excesses" which does not correspond to the actual pattern of
repression under the dictatorship. It is now established that the "ex-
cesses" were a pervasive and systematic feature of that pattern. The re-
port of the National Commission discredited the view that human rights
abuses under the dictatorship resulted from aberrant individual conduct
or that a majority of participants merely "followed orders." According
to the Commission, "human rights were violated in an organic and offi-
cial form by the repression of the armed forces. They were violated not
in a sporadic way, but rather in a systematic manner, always the same
way, with similar abduction and identical torments in the entire extent of
the territory." 116
The language of Law 23.049 and preexisting military law, coupled
with the systematic nature of the human rights violations, tends to ex-
pose a very large number of lower-ranking officers to criminal convic-
tion.117 However, courts may eventually look past the contradictions and
gaps left by imperfect drafting to the spirit of the provision, which clearly
was intended by the government to shield the vast majority of lower and
middle-ranking participants. The courts ultimately took such a prag-
matic view in overlooking formidible gaps between the language of the
jurisdictional provisions of Law 23.049 and the facts of individual cases.
If courts indeed broaden the "following orders" defense to encompass
such systematic excesses and thus prevent the conviction of many hun-
dreds of subordinate military personnel, the defense could shield from
criminal liability virtually all those who personally carried out abduc-
tions, torture, and summary executions. Such a result would be morally
and legally indefensible. The conclusions of the National Commission
thus pose a political dilemma for the government, which must reassess its
strategy in the human rights prosecutions. The question remains, as in
the case of the government's jurisdictional decision, whether the concilia-
tory approach represented by the broad "following orders" defense fos-
ters the political goal of establishing the rule of civilian law over the
armed forces.
B. The Ethics and Politics of the "Following Orders" Defense
The discussion thus far leaves unanswered the moral questions that are
sharply posed in each of the thousands of human rights prosecutions in
Argentina today: what should be the degree of liability of the general
116. NUNCA MAs, supra note 1, at 8.
117. See supra note 1.
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who orders "the eradication of the subversive elements," the captain who
conducts interrogations after his subordinates have completed a torture
session, or the young lieutenant who applies the electric prod or tightens
the manacles from which his victim is to hang for hours by the wrists?118
The government and the human rights community agree that those at
the very pinnacle of the military hierarchy-the junta members and re-
gional commanders of the armed forces in charge of the anti-subversive
repression-cannot submit a plea of ignorance. General Videla must be
held to have been at least constructively aware of the numerous abuses
discussed in the National Commission report. The very extent and degree
of coordination of the repressive network, together with the hierarchical
and disciplined nature of the armed forces, provide overwhelming evi-
dence from which to conclude, even in the face of denials from the gen-
eral and his cohorts, that the very highest command of the armed forces
was both fully cognizant and completely in control of the entire repres-
sive apparatus.
The next level of high-ranking officers involved-those who com-
manded and administered the concentration camps and torture centers
and coordinated the numerous local task forces which abducted the vic-
tims and conducted initial torture sessions- includes some of the most
notorious criminals. Their physical presence among the captors and tor-
mentors of the desaparecidos-as often witnessed by numerous former
prisoners-vitiates any conceivable defense of ignorance; moreover, their
broad decision-making authority should render unacceptable any defense
on the basis of mere obedience to orders, including the defense formu-
lated in Law 23.049.
The lower and middle-ranking officers pose a more difficult case. They
personally abducted civilians from their homes and workplaces using un-
marked vehicles and false identification documents, conducted torture
and interrogation sessions in clandestine detention centers, and carried
out a yet unknown number of summary executions, all in the absence of
any legal authority beyond the order or approval of a military superior.
While the culpability of these young officers is surely diminished to some
degree by their relative lack of decision-making authority, the immedi-
acy of their contact with the victims magnifies the repugnance of their
acts.
Even allowing for the necessity of military institutions in which disci-
pline and hierarchy play a central role, and even if these subordinate
118. See NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 26-53, for an elaboration of the methods of torture
that the Argentine military developed during the dictatorship.
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officers actually acted under orders, the contempt of these individuals for
individual human rights and human life should nonetheless subject them
to punishment. A dedication to military discipline unlimited by such fun-
damental values as those trampled upon by the Argentine dictatorship is
neither socially desirable nor morally defensible.
The concern here is not with the severity of punishment that should be
meted out to the soldier or his commanding officer. Civilian criminal law
provides a defense for those who acted under actual duress, and contains
well-developed standards for evaluating various mitigating and aggravat-
ing circumstances in cases of those who committed crimes at the instiga-
tion of others. But the broad "following orders" defense envisioned by
the government would shield many of those responsible for gross human
rights abuses from any requirement that they answer to the civilian au-
thorities and the civilian victims for their conduct in the "battle against
subversion." The government's goal of restoring the rule of law and ci-
vilian authority over the armed forces cannot be advanced by suspending
the legal standards of a democratic society with respect to the most sys-
tematic and pervasive violation of legal and human rights in the history
of Argentina.
Conclusion
The ongoing prosecutions of human rights violations in Argentina
raise fundamental concerns of individual justice' 19 and the future of the
rule of law. At the individual level, justice to the desaparecidos and their
families requires prosecution of all those responsible for the abductions,
acts of torture, and killings during the dictatorship. Yet many argue
that, if the members of the armed forces face the punishment that justice
would demand, the survival of civilian rule could be jeopardized.
On the contrary, the future of Argentine society requires a subordina-
tion of the military to civilian justice. The ongoing prosecutions are of
enormous historical importance to the Argentine military, whose coup-
119. The conception of justice advanced here is a narrow one: the legitimate expectation of
each victim of state-inspired terror to secure legal redress for the overwhelming harms com-
mitted. In the poignant words of one such individual:
I do not care who has to fall or how many are condemned. They kidnapped and tortured
my daughter. They murdered her in cold blood and made my grandchild disappear.
Now, I want justice.
Chelala, Argentina, Prosecute All Officers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1984, at 23, col. 1. This concept
of justice, focusing on the equal access of victims to legal institutions, falls within a rudimen-
tary definition of justice as requiring that there be "no arbitrary distinctions. . .made between
persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and. . . [that] the rules determine a proper
balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 5 (1971).
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mongering is a constant undercurrent in Argentine politics. If the hun-
dreds of junior officers who committed acts of repression are shielded
from criminal responsibility, they will emerge as the new leadership of
the armed forces. These new leaders will have learned that a civilian
government, even one armed with with an overwhelming mandate to
prosecute the members of a militarily defeated and demoralized armed
forces, lacks the will and the power to punish those responsible for law-
less repression. Thus, the punishment of the guilty is essential to any
governmental policy that seeks to demonstrate to the military that Ar-
gentina will never again tolerate such contempt for humanity. In both
Argentina and the rest of the world, those concerned with human rights
await with hope and some anxiety the outcome of the bold project
launched by the government and the people of Argentina.
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